| 基于Shapley值法的移动增值服务价值链利润分配模型 |
| Profit Distribution Model of Mobile Added value Services Value Chain Based on Shapley value Method |
| 投稿时间：2014-03-25 |
| 中文关键词:移动增值服务价值链 合作博弈 Shapley值 利润分配 |
| 英文关键词:mobile value added services value chain cooperative game Shapley value profit distribution |
| 基金项目:安徽省高校省级自然科学研究项目（KJ2014ZD21）;阜阳师范学院委托专项课题（2014WLGH01） |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 研究了一条由单个的移动设备制造商、单个的移动网络运营商和单个的服务提供商构成的移动增值服务价值链。构建了移动增值服务价值链中成员间的合作博弈模型，并利用Shapley值法研究了联盟博弈机制下成员间的利润分配问题。研究表明：独立决策下的移动增值服务价值链的利润最低；小联盟决策虽然能够提高价值链系统的利润，但小联盟极不稳定，容易瓦解；利用Shapley值法协调后的大联盟具有较好的稳定性，且能满足集体理性和个体理性的要求。最后通过数值例子对所得结论进行了验证。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| In this paper, a mobile value added services value chain which consists of a single manufacturer, a single mobile network operator and a service provider is researched. A cooperative game model among members of the mobile value added services value chain is built, and the Shapley Value method is used to research distribution of profits among members of the value chain under League game mechanism. The results show that: Under independent decision making situations, profit of the mobile value added service value chain is minimum; Although minor League decision can improve the profits of the value chain system, minor League is very unstable, and is neutralized easily; While the major league coordinated by using the Shapley value method is relatively more stable, and it can meet the collective rationality and rational individual requirements. Finally, the conclusions are tested by a numerical example. |
| 冯 艳 刚.基于Shapley值法的移动增值服务价值链利润分配模型[J].石家庄铁道大学学报(社会科学版),2014(3):1-7. |
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