| 妥协可接受的随机合作对策的妥协值 |
| Compromise Value of Compromise Admissible Stochastic Cooperative Game |
| 投稿时间：2009-09-03 |
| 中文关键词:随机合作对策 妥协值 支付 核心 |
| 英文关键词:compromise value stochastic cooperative game payoff core |
| 基金项目:河北省自然科学基金资助项目(A2005000301) |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 以妥协可接受的NTU对策的妥协值和TU对策的[WTBX]τ值为基础，将妥协值的性质推广到随机合作对策的模型中，从而得到具有非空核心的、妥协可接受随机合作对策的妥协值是可期望得到的最大支付和最小权之间的协调值，且妥协值介于两者之间。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| This paper extends the notion of the compromise value which is based on the compromise value for NTU games and τ value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty cores of compromise admissible stochastic cooperative game is bounded by the utopia payoffs and minimal rights, and that the compromise value for stochastic cooperative game is compromise between the utopia payoffs and minimal rights. |
| 刘微,李靖,冯英杰.妥协可接受的随机合作对策的妥协值[J].石家庄铁道大学学报(自然科学版),2009,(4):71-74. |
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